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INTRODUCTION
This article is concerned with development of America’s ocean
wind resources on federal offshore lands. Our focus is on this question: If
United States policymakers conclude that the national interest would be
served by accelerating deployment of ocean wind energy, does the history
of United States public lands policy offer ideas for actions to stimulate
development? This article will touch on tax and environmental policy
related to renewable energy, but only briefly, and while we describe the
current ocean wind siting regulatory regime, we are not providing a howto guide for developers or critics. Our goal is to expand the current policy
discussion by offering examples from the nation’s history of public lands
policy that suggest an additional, supplemental, way of thinking about
how to bring ocean wind into the energy marketplace.
United States energy policy is evolving in a direction to favor
domestic renewable and low-carbon energy resources. The direction of
change is becoming clear, even if the pace and details are not. Substantial
disagreements remain, but, in time, the United States seems destined to
shift its energy generation portfolio heavily toward domestic wind, solar,
other renewables, and natural gas.
Natural gas abundance is the story of the day, as new extraction
techniques boost gas supplies, cut prices, and push down demand for other
fossil and conventional fuels. But the renewable energy industry has been
busy in the United States—at least onshore. More than 48,600 megawatts
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1

(“MW”) in wind generation are online today, along with 7,700 MW of
2
installed solar electric capacity.
Approximately twenty percent of
3
existing wind generation is on federal land, all onshore.
The size of the ocean wind resource is great—four times the total
4
United States electricity generation capacity today by one estimate. Its
location is near to many of the nation’s largest economic centers. The
ocean wind resource is rich and in a good place. European and Asian
countries have moved aggressively to develop ocean wind and at least 55
5
projects are in operation. No offshore wind projects exist in the United
States today, though several pioneering projects are moving forward
toward development.
United States policymakers have begun to understand how to tap
ocean wind, but are only at the threshold of that effort. The Obama
Administration’s steps to promote ocean wind energy have been, quite
literally, unprecedented. The President and his key cabinet officials have
made renewables, including ocean wind, key elements of the
6
Administration’s energy policy. Virtually all the prime development
areas—those with the highest and steadiest wind speeds—are located in
federal waters where use of the seabed is under the jurisdiction of the
United States Department of the Interior (“DOI” or the “Interior

1.
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fact Sheet: Renewable Energy
and
the
BLM,
http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wo/minerals__realty__and_resource_pr
otection_/energy/solar_and_wind.Par.38552.File.dat/Wind_12_2012.pdf (last updated
January 2013).
2.
Solar Energy Industries Association, Solar Industry Data,
http://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-industry-data (accessed April 17, 2013).
3.
BLM, Energy, http://www.blm.gov/or/energy/ (accessed April 17,
2013).
4.
Bureau of Energy Management (BOEM), Offshore Wind Energy,
http://www.boem.gov/Renewable-Energy-Program/Renewable-EnergyGuide/Offshore-Wind-Energy.aspx.
5.
See European Wind Energy Association, The European Offshore Wind
Industry – Key Trends and Statistics 2012 3 (January 2013) (describing the 55
operational offshore wind projects in Europe); LI Junfeng, et al., China Wind Energy
Outlook 2012 ES-1, http://www.gwec.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/ChinaOutlook-2012-EN.pdf (describing the 38 offshore wind projects in the development
phase in China).
6.
See generally The White House, Energy, Climate Change and Our
Environment, http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/securing-american-energy#energymenu.
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Department”). It would be difficult to overstate the challenge faced by
Interior Department officials, other agencies, and all categories of
stakeholders in creating a new regulatory regime for a brand new industry
8
seeking to make new industrial use of the oceans.
The current
Administration’s efforts have opened the door and allowed a small number
of investors to begin moving forward with development plans. That such
progress has occurred in just a few years is a credit to the quality of effort
brought to the task by people in government, the energy industry,
academia, the marine conservation community, and others.
The actual scale of the challenge to those who have worked to
elevate ocean wind development as a public policy is suggested by the fact
that the national ocean policy announced by the Obama Administration in
2010 makes only the briefest passing reference to ocean renewable energy
development, and only as a future use to be considered within a
comprehensive management scheme alongside every other existing and
9
potential use of the oceans. While the Administration’s policy document
cites the risk to ocean ecosystems from climate change, and includes two
pictures of ocean wind installations (in other countries), the potential role
of the United States’ oceans in hosting renewable technology draws no
10
actual analysis.

7.
See generally Marc Schwartz, Donna Heimiller et al., Assessment of
Offshore Wind Energy Resources for the United States (June 2010), available at
http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/pdfs/offshore/offshore_wind_resource_assess
ment.pdf; DOE Wind Program Resource Assessment & Characterization,
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/resource_assessment_characterization.html.
8.
A 2007 article written by one of the authors described the ocean
renewable energy regulatory system as “a patchwork of policies and rules written
primarily for other needs. It manages to be fragmented and redundant, prescriptive
and vague, authoritarian and leaderless. The overall effect of the rules is confused;
they do not say “No” to offshore renewable development, but they do not say “Yes”
either.” Thomas C. Jensen, Offshore Renewable Energy Development after the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 2 (36th Conference on Environmental Law, ABA Section of the
Environment,
Energy
and
Resources
2007),
(available
at
http://www.oceanrenewable.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/03/aba-ocs-paperfinal.pdf). The law has not changed since then, and the Administration’s progress
should be seen against that backdrop.
9.
Exec. Procl. 13547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43023 (July 19, 2010) [hereinafter
Exec. Procl. 13547]. (The Presidential Executive Order establishing the National
Ocean Council to implement the policy does not mention ocean renewable energy).
10.
Exec. Procl. 13547, supra. n. 9, at 41, 55.
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The current Administration’s ocean wind promotion efforts have
been unprecedented, but the underlying legal regime for ocean wind
development is premised on the traditional approach taken to oil and gas
leasing in federal waters, a legal regime rooted in a different era, for a
different industry. The current Administration’s efforts to encourage
ocean wind development have been grafted onto, and necessarily
constrained by, the premise of current law that the United States is a
landlord, energy developers are tenants, energy uses consume the
landlord’s estate, and the landlord is owed a direct financial return by the
tenant.
The Constitution gives Congress the power to “dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
11
Property belonging to the United States.”
That broad writ offers
Congress ample room to consider many policy options for ocean wind
beyond current law. Seen against the backdrop of a changing atmosphere,
the gap between the resource to be developed and development of the
resource compels the question whether more can be done.
This article describes the ocean wind resource, the state of the
industry as of mid-2013, and current federal ocean wind policy. Turning
to look back, the article offers an overview of historical public lands laws
and programs that were key tools in using the public domain for the
benefit of the country. Of course, the nation’s priorities have changed
with time, the country has grown wiser about natural resource decisionmaking, and every old public lands law has features that would be wrong
for today’s world. But those laws made things happen that the nation
wanted done. Some details of the older public lands laws are obsolete, but
their effectiveness remains relevant, and they deserve careful
consideration for the lessons they offer now.
The final section of the paper suggests several ways policymakers
might apply the lessons of older public lands laws to ocean wind energy.
In short, and at the risk of overgeneralization, the United States made big
things happen when it traded ownership for development, sovereign
prerogative for private investment, and one good for another. The nation
has learned painful lessons about how some development of public
resources has adverse social costs, including degradation of the oceans.
Failure to develop key resources—including domestic renewable (and
other) energy resources—has social costs, too.

11.

U.S. Const.. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

98

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

The article does not attempt to answer the question whether the
impacts of climate change shift the equation such that the country should
now trade some of its ownership of marine public lands in exchange for
wind energy. But we think it is a prudent, albeit challenging, question.
We offer suggestions for ways to think about the answer, recognizing that
Americans have a special bond with the oceans that make it difficult to
discuss even small policy changes to encourage development. In an era of
climate change concern, no option for use of public resources should be
off the table as a potential policy tool. Every choice available to
policymakers deserves rational consideration.

I. THE OCEAN WIND RESOURCE IN THE ERA OF CLIMATE
CHANGE
The ocean wind resource in United States marine waters is
12
estimated to be as large as 4,223 gigawatts (“GW”), with as many as
13
1,372 terawatt hours of electricity available off the East Coast alone.
The low estimate of the resource is roughly four times the generating
14
capacity of the current United States electric grid.
Ocean wind is a green energy asset owned by the American people.
It is an energy source for the country that will be available forever. It can
be found in undeveloped areas near almost all coastal urban centers. It is
of a potential scale that dwarfs most other alternatives, and is big enough
to shrink the United States’ carbon footprint toward fitting even the most
constrictive greenhouse gas policy.
Today, America’s ocean wind energy is unharvested. While
thousands of turbines spin onshore, and nations around the globe have
15
developed at least 57 marine wind projects, no turbines have been sited

12.
BOEM, Offshore Wind Energy, http://www.boem.gov/RenewableEnergy-Program/Renewable-Energy-Guide/Offshore-Wind-Energy.aspx
(accessed
April 17, 2013).
13.
Bjorn Carey, Stanford Report, Offshore wind energy could power entire
U.S.
East
Coast,
Stanford
scientists
say,
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/september/offshore-wind-energy-091412.html
(Sept. 14, 2012).
14.
BOEM, Offshore Wind Energy, supra n. 4.
15.
Energy and Environmental Management (EAEM), The EAEM Guide to
the UK Offshore Energy Development, Global Wind Energy Council, Global
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in United States waters. An energy resource area larger than the total
16
landmass of the United States, one wholly owned by the American
people, is unused and wasted as a tool to power our communities.
The strong majority view among scientists is that greenhouse gas
emissions are changing the Earth’s atmosphere in ways that pose vast
17
environmental, economic, and social risks. United States policymakers
are divided about the science and the conclusions to be drawn from it.
Many remain determined to promote traditional fossil fuels, while many
others are pressing to find ways to drive down carbon emissions through
development of renewable energy resources, conservation, sequestration,
18
and other approaches. Extreme weather events and other changes have
Offshore:
Current
Status
and
Future
Prospects,
http://www.eaem.co.uk/ebook/offshorewind/ebook.php?page=14 (Autumn 2012).
16.
U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st
Century, Final Report (Sept. 20, 2004).
17.
Julia Pyper and Climatewire, Scientific American, Nations Change Too
Slowly to Combat Climate Change, (Mar. 21, 2013) (“The world is already on its way
to a warmer future, and without radical change, experts said yesterday, that
temperature rise soon will reach crisis levels. Scientists estimate that the planet has
already warmed by about 0.8 degree Celsius since the 1850s, and new projections put
temperature rise as high as 4 degrees by the middle of the 21st century if current
emissions levels persist.”); See Council on Economic Advisors, 2013 Economic
Report of the President 185 (March 2013) (“The most significant long-term pollution
challenge facing America and the world is the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse
gases. The scientific consensus, as reflected in the 2009 assessment by the U.S.
Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) on behalf of the National Science and
Technology Council, is that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are causing
changes in the climate that include rising average national and global temperatures,
warming oceans, rising average sea levels, more extreme heat waves and storms, and
extinctions of species and loss of biodiversity. A multitude of other impacts have
been observed in every region of the country and virtually all economic sectors. As
part of the United Nations Climate Change Conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun,
the United States pledged to cut its carbon dioxide (CO2) and other human-induced
greenhouse gas emissions in the range of 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020, and
to meet its long-term goal of reducing emissions by 83 percent by 2050.
Approximately 87 percent of U.S. anthropogenic emissions of all greenhouse gases
(primarily CO2 and methane) are energy-related, and fossil-fuel combustion accounts
for approximately 94 percent of U.S. CO2 emissions”).
18.
An example of the advocacy by pro-fossil fuel interests and legislators
can be found in H.R. 3409, a bill passed by the House of Representatives in 2012
entitled the “Stop the War on Coal Act.” The bill, which did not receive consideration
in the Senate, included a range of provisions aimed at blocking regulations or other
executive branch initiatives unfavorable to coal. Energy & Commerce Committee,
Stop the War on Coal Act (H.R. 3409), 9 (Sept. 20, 2012), (available at
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lent prominence and urgency to the issue, as exemplified by President
Obama’s pledge in his second inaugural address:
We, the people, still believe that our obligations as
Americans are not just to ourselves, but to all posterity.
We will respond to the threat of climate change, knowing
that the failure to do so would betray our children and
future generations.
Some may still deny the
overwhelming judgment of science, but none can avoid
the devastating impact of raging fires and crippling
drought and more powerful storms.
The path towards sustainable energy sources will be long
and sometimes difficult. But America cannot resist this
transition, we must lead it. We cannot cede to other
nations the technology that will power new jobs and new
industries, we must claim its promise. That’s how we will
maintain our economic vitality and our national treasure -our forests and waterways, our crop lands and snowcapped peaks. That is how we will preserve our planet,
commanded to our care by God. That’s what will lend
19
meaning to the creed our fathers once declared.
In late June 2013, the President followed up his inaugural statement
with a more specific set of directives to federal agencies to both reduce
carbon emissions and prepare the country to adapt to the various
environmental and other changes already underway because of changes in
20
the atmosphere.

http://energycommerce.house.gov/fact-sheet/stop-war-coal-act-hr-340);
Pete
Kasperowicz, House approves ‘Stop the War on Coal’ bill in last act before November
election (Sept. 21, 2012), (available at http://thehill.com/blogs/flooraction/house/250957-house-approves-coal-deregulation-bill-in-last-act-beforeelection). For a general overview of the advocacy associated with those seeking to
reduce carbon emissions, see generally The White House, Energy, Climate Change
and our Environment, (http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/) (accessed Sept. 1, 2013).
19.
Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (D.C. Jan. 21, 2013) (available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-presidentbarack-obama).
20.
Barack Obama, Remarks on Climate Change (D.C. June 25, 2013)
(available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-
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European countries have installed more than 1,662 offshore wind
21
turbines in marine areas. Japan is planning to build the world’s largest
22
offshore wind farm with 143 turbines.
China has announced plans to
23
have 5 million kilowatts of offshore wind capacity by 2015.
Those
countries have relied heavily on financial subsidy programs to encourage
24
ocean wind , and some, particularly those in heavily populated northern
Europe, have far less onshore territory for wind projects than the United
States, making offshore development more immediately attractive as a
25
development option.
Energy subsidies invite debate, and local
conditions are different in some ways, but the immediately relevant
feature of other countries’ policy choices is that they have worked. Other
nations have found ways to stimulate an aggressive pioneering effort by
wind developers to harvest and reap the benefits of ocean wind.
By contrast, the United States is stuck on the beach. The image is
not entirely fair in an absolute sense: During the Bush Administration,
Congress gave the Interior Department express authority to lease the
26
seabed for renewable energy projects along with oil and gas.
The
Obama Administration has set a goal of achieving 54 GW of deployed

president-climate-change). See, NY Times, Obama Outlines Ambitious Plan to Cut
Greenhouse
Gases
(June
26,
2013),
(available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/politics/obama-plan-to-cut-greenhousegases.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0).
21.
Offshore Wind Development Coalition, Why Offshore Wind,
http://offshorewinddc.org/why-offshore-wind/ (accessed Mar. 25, 2013).
22.
Chris Rose, European Wind Energy Assn., World’s Largest Offshore
Wind Farm Planned for Japanese Waters, http://www.ewea.org/blog/2013/01/worldslargest-offshore-wind-farm-planned-for-japanese-waters/ (Jan. 23, 2013)
23.
PR Newswire, China’s Offshore Wind Market Expected to Grow to US
$16 billion, (Feb. 27. 2013) (available at http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/chinas-offshore-wind-market-expected-to-grow-to-us16-billion193557891.html).
24.
See, e.g., Alex Morales & Sally Bakewell, U.K. Grants Offshore Wind
Triple Market Electricity Rates, Bloomberg (June 30, 2013) (available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-27/u-k-to-pay-offshore-wind-companiestriple-market-rate-for-power.html).
25.
For information on the onshore and offshore wind development
potential in Europe, see European Environrnent Agency, Europe’s onshore and
offshore wind energy potential: An assessment of environmental and economic
constraints (EEA Technical Report No. 6/2009).
26.
See infra nn. 49 to 53 and corresponding text.
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27

offshore wind generating capacity by 2030, enough to power the
28
equivalent of 12.8 million homes. It has taken small, but material steps
to achieve it. The Administration has implemented a federal seabed
leasing process, pressed the many agencies with ocean resource related
jurisdiction to coordinate their pieces of the siting process, and funded
29
wind technology research and development grants.
Congress has
enacted general renewable energy incentives through the tax code, but has
been unwilling to impose green energy mandates on utilities or other
30
requirements that might aggressively stimulate ocean energy.
United States policy measures are showing some results, with one
high-profile commercial project making substantial progress toward
31
development off the Massachusetts coast, others entering the first stages

27.
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy, A National Offshore Wind Strategy: Creating An Offshore Wind Energy
Industry in the United States iii (Feb. 7, 2011) [hereinafter National Offshore Wind
Strategy].
28.
American Wind Energy Assn. (AWEA), America’s Produced 50
Gigawatts Total U.S. Wind Power Capacity: What does 50 GW of Wind Power
Mean?, http://www.powerofwind.com/uploads/files/infographic_awea.jpg (accessed
April 17, 2013).
29.
See infra § IV.
30.
A discussion of the regulatory system for other ocean renewable energy
sources, such as tides and waves, is presented in Jack K. Sterne, Thomas C. Jensen,
Julie Keil and Richard Roos-Collins with David Wand, Symposium: The Seven
Principles of Ocean Renewable Energy: A Shared Vision and Call for Action,14
Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 600 (2009); Mark Sherman, Wave New World: Promoting
Ocean Wave Energy Development Through Federal-State Coordination and
Streamlined Licensing, 39 Envtl. L. 1161 (2009).
31.
BOEM, Cape Wind, http://www.boem.gov/Renewable-EnergyProgram/Studies/Cape-Wind.aspx (accessed April 17, 2013) (The Cape Wind Project
proposed for federal waters off Massachusetts has been in development since 2001
and has received wide publicity as the developers have struggled against regulatory
uncertainty and determined opposition. The project appears to be on the cusp of
development as of early 2013.); Cape Wind, “Cape Wind Finalizes Engagement of
Bank
of
Tokyo-Mitsubishi
UFJ
for
Debt
Financing,”
http://www.capewind.org/news1314.htm) (Mar. 19, 2013) (Describing recent
developments in the financing of the Cape Wind Project in Massachussetts.); David
Richardson, Grist: Beacon in the Smog, “Cape Wind wins billions in backing,
launches offshore wind in the U.S.,” http://grist.org/climate-energy/cape-wind-wins-afew-billion-in-backing-launches-offshore-wind-in-the-u-s/ (accessed Mar. 27, 2013).
See generally, Wendy Williams and Roger Whitcomb, Cape Wind: Money, Celebrity,
Class, Politics and the Battle for Our Energy Future on Nantucket Sound (2007) (a
lively telling of the first six or seven years of battles over the Cape Wind project).
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of the siting process, and some small scale technology demonstration
32
projects moving forward in Oregon, Maine, and other sites. Admirable
for their ambition and entrepreneurial verve, and important as trailblazers,
these projects, even taken together, are tiny, essentially invisible features
of the energy landscape. By comparison to Europe and China, the United
States is lagging in making use of its ocean wind energy resources.
Ocean wind development will not proceed in a substantial way
without changes that bring its cost in closer alignment to other power
sources. Until ocean wind is a better investment, most sources of capital
will put their energy sector dollars elsewhere, and most electricity
providers will look to other resources, particularly natural gas and onshore
renewables.
The national debate on energy policy has offered numerous ideas—the
carbon tax and renewable energy portfolio standards most notable among
them—that would have the effect of making relatively high-cost resources
33
like ocean wind more attractive to investors.
The merits of these
proposals are worthy of very serious consideration, but converting ideas
into lawmaking is a step that Congress seems unlikely to take any time
soon. The amount of common ground between the parties on major
features of energy policy seems limited to support for domestic natural gas
production and a handful of tax incentives. Beyond that, it is not apparent
that any other substantial policy idea circulating today can garner enough
votes to win approval in both chambers.
A. Restructuring Our Thinking about Ocean Wind Resources
Promotion of ocean wind energy can be approached through
different lenses. Should we think of the issue as a question of energy
policy? Electricity policy? Ocean policy? Environmental policy?
Whatever else it may be, ocean wind policy is fundamentally a question of

32.
DOE,
Offshore
Wind
Technology,
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/offshore_wind.html (accessed March 10, 2013).
33.
For a discussion of the carbon tax, see Congressional Budget Office,
Effect of a Carbon Tax on the Economy and the Environment,
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44223_Carbon_0.pdf
(May 2013); Laura D’Andrea Tyson, The Myriad Benefits of a Carbon Tax, NY
Times,
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/the-myriad-benefits-of-acarbon-tax/ (June 26, 2013); Wall Street Journal, “CBO Report: The Pros and Cons of
Carbon Tax”, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/05/22/cbo-report-the-pros-andcons-of-carbon-tax/ (May 22, 2013).
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public lands policy. And thinking of ocean wind development as a public
lands issue may offer policymakers a path forward that is more likely to
result in actual policy-making. It may offer a way of thinking about the
problem that can appeal to those who favor private markets and emphasize
the spirit of private enterprise and those who want to stimulate non-carbon
electricity generation and build the domestic renewable energy industry.
The United States marine waters are by far the nation’s largest area
34
of public lands. An area fifteen times larger than all the national forests,
35
and seventeen times bigger than Texas, United States marine waters and
submerged lands can be seen as this century’s great wide open frontier—
particularly with respect to the renewable energy potential. In many ways,
United States policymakers stand today where earlier generations of
leaders stood when deciding what our country would do with the land
beyond the Alleghenies, with the Ohio Country, Louisiana Purchase,
Oregon Territory, California, the Southwest, Alaska, and the Pacific
territories. One way or another, the lands had come under the flag of the
United States. They had resources in demand here and around the world.
American citizens and others were willing to take great risks to go to those
places and develop those resources. Bounders and scoundrels were mixed
in with explorers, pioneers, and settlers. Enormous potential problems
were obvious, but much was unknown. What policies would make sense?
What risks were worth taking? Who would bear the cost to find out?
One generation after another, American leaders set public lands
policies that fit their times. Mining, grazing, homesteading, railroads,
irrigation, forests, parks, and wilderness have each seized lawmakers’
attention and become governed in myriad ways.
At each step,
policymakers have struggled to reconcile the moral, legal, and policy
36
dimensions of the nation’s relationship with Native Americans. Our

34.
The U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone is 4,453,068 square miles. See
Pew
Oceans
Commission,
America’s
Living
Oceans
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Protecting_ocean
_life/env_pew_oceans_final_report.pdf (May 2003).
The U.S. Forest Service
manages 193 million acres of national forests and grasslands. See U.S. Forest Service,
An Overview 9, http://www.fs.fed.us/documents/USFS_An_Overview_0106MJS.pdf.
35.
The square mileage of Texas is 261,123.71. See U.S.Census, Texas,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html.
36.
Scholarship on the story of the United States’ interaction with Native
Americans is too vast and complicated to cite a single definitive source. There is no
better source than the body of work authored by Professor Charles Wilkinson,
particularly Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations (2005); Fire on the
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policies have shifted from conquest to development to conservation and
preservation as the successes and failures of earlier choices have become
37
evident.
The set of laws governing use of the United States’ marine territory
is dominated by mid-20th century statutes that resolved key terms of the
federal and state governments’ respective sovereign and proprietary rights
offshore. On top of the ownership decisions lies a body of law that is
largely a product of negative lessons learned from overfishing, oil spills,
coastal habitat degradation, and marine mammal hunting. Only one
statutory provision speaks to development of ocean wind, and does so only
in a cautious way, quite unlike the laws that settled the West.
II. OCEAN WIND ENERGY REGULATION TODAY
A. The Federal Seabed Leasing Process
The United States regulates its marine territory primarily through
38
the Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
39
The OCSLA and SLA were
(“OCSLA”), both enacted in 1953.
prompted by the discovery and rapid exploitation of offshore oil and gas in
40
the first half the 20th century.
Discoveries of major offshore fields in
California and the Gulf Coast led to a boom in drilling and disagreements
between the federal government and the states (and among the states) over
which sovereigns owned the resource and would have power to levy
royalties on those extracting it.
The Submerged Lands Act (SLA) of 1953 grants states title to all
submerged navigable lands within their boundaries, including rivers and
41
marine areas generally within three geographical miles offshore.
The
OCSLA secures to the federal government ownership rights over the Outer
Continental Shelf (“OCS”), defined as all submerged lands lying seaward

Plateau: Conflict and Endurance in the American Soutwest (1999); and Messages
from Franks Landing: A Story of Salmon, Treaties, and the Indian Way (2000).
37.
Lawrence J. MacDonnell and Sarah F. Bates, The Evolution of Natural
Resources Law and Policy (ABA 2010).
38.
43 U.S.C. §§1301–1315 (2006).
39.
Id. at § 1331-1356(a).
40.
Robert Sollen, An Ocean of Oil: A Century of Political Struggle Over
Petroleum Off the California Coast (Denali Press, 1998).
41.
43 U.S.C. § 1311.
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42

of the state coastal waters. It also authorizes the Secretary of the Interior
43
to administer mineral exploration and development on the OCS.
Over the years, the federal OCS leasing program has grown into a
major revenue source for the federal government, with around $4 billion
44
collected annually. The industry itself is reported to have invested more
than $80 billion in the Gulf of Mexico between 2008-2010, or more than
45
$25 billion per year. Congress has from time-to-time directed changes in
royalty collection practices to stimulate industry investment in exploration
46
of deep water sites.
Federal leasing practices have grown in complexity as the industry
has developed and impacts on marine resources have emerged, particularly
in the wake of incidents like the Santa Barbara spill of 1969 and the
47
Deepwater Horizon blowout of 2010. The OCS oil and gas lease terms
are extensive, providing for initial terms of up to ten years and extensions
that may continue for as long as a lease produces revenue-generating oil or
48
gas. The process DOI uses to issue leases is complicated and expensive
to a degree that mirrors the revenues; complexity and sophistication of the
industry; and the tensions between oil and gas extraction and the many
other public values of the oceans and coasts.
Congress amended the OCSLA with the Energy Policy Act of 2005
49
(“EPAct”). Section 388 of EPAct gave DOI authority to issue leases for

42.
Id. at § 1331(a).
43.
Id. at § 1334.
44.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Offshore
Oil and Gas, http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/oceanreport/oilandgas.html (accessed
April 17, 2013).
45.
Quest Economics, The Economic Impacts of GoM Oil and Natural Gas
Development on the U.S. Economy, http://www.scribd.com/doc/59786422/U-S-Gulfof-Mexico-Oil-and-Natural-Gas-Industry-Economic-Impact-Analysis (June 2011).
46.
See, e.g., Matthew Moerschbaecher and John W. Day, Jr., UltraDeepwater Gulf of Mexico Oil and Gas: Energy Return on Financial Investment and a
Preliminary Assessment of Energy Return on Energy Investment, 3 Sustainability
2009 (2011) (explaining how Congress promoted investment in offshore oil by
decreasing royalty fees through the Deepwater Royalty Relief Act).
47.
DOI, Salazar Launches Safety and Environmental Protection Reforms
to Toughen Oversight of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations (May 11, 2011)
(http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Launches-Safety-and-EnvironmentalProtection-Reforms-to-Toughen-Oversight-of-Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-Operations.cfm).
48.
30 C.F.R. § 556.37 (WL current through Oct. 1, 2011).
49.
See Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (codified throughout
sections of Titles 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
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50

offshore wind energy on the OCS. EPAct specifically authorizes DOI to
grant leases for activities that (1) produce or support production,
transportation, or transmission of energy from sources other than oil and
gas, or (2) allow for alternate uses of existing facilities on the OCS. The
law also gives DOI the authority to act as a lead agency for coordinating
the permitting process with other federal agencies and to monitor and
regulate those facilities used for renewable energy production and energy
51
support services.
The renewable energy leasing provision in EPAct was Congress’
answer to a different question than how best to promote ocean wind
energy. The bitter fight over the Cape Wind project in federal waters off
Massachusetts had revealed that no law expressly charged any specific
federal agency with authority to lease the seabed for renewable energy
purposes. DOI had clear oil and gas leasing power in the OCS, but the
law was silent on leasing for renewables. Congress plugged the hole in
the law (and frustrated Cape Wind opponents in the process) by granting
52
DOI renewable leasing authority—but that is all they did.
The law
clarifies the landlord’s authority to lease for renewable energy, but does
53
not affirmatively promote ocean wind in any other way.
The provisions governing marine renewable leasing closely
resemble the oil and gas leasing provisions of the OCSLA and imply that

50.
Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13201–13253 (2006) (EPAct
does not supersede or modify any other federal authority, apply to areas designated as
National Marine Sanctuaries, National Parks, National Wildlife Refuges, National
Monuments, or cover ocean thermal energy resources); see 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(9).
51.
43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(1).
52.
Jensen, supra n. 8, at 3 (“The Act does not expressly authorize any
specific offshore renewable project, but does provide limited special treatment for
OCS projects that were in a permitting process prior to enactment of the new law.
Section 388(d) allowed Interior to adopt the pre-existing permit applications for the
purpose of Interior’s own review. As a practical matter, the only beneficiaries of that
savings provision were the Cape Wind project and the proposed Long Island Offshore
Wind Park, both of which were under review by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Litigation brought by opponents of the Cape Wind project had contended that the
Corps of Engineers lacked authority to site the project. Section 388 did not resolve
that question, per se, but did firmly grant siting authority to the Interior Department.”)
53.
Id. at 18. (“The Energy Policy Act marks progress for offshore
renewable energy, but many questions remain unanswered. It will probably prove to
be the case that the most substantial impact of Section 388 will be the focus it brings
to the legislative choices Congress needs to confront in the next iteration of federal
energy policy.”).
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the law’s drafters saw renewable energy principally as another revenuegenerating use of the OCS: “The Secretary shall establish royalties, fees,
rentals, bonuses, or other payments to ensure a fair return to the United
States for any lease, easement, or right-of-way granted under this
54
subsection.” DOI is implementing the law largely within the paradigm
of its experience with oil and gas leasing; DOI’s approach is that of a
landlord, carefully choosing its tenants and collecting rents and fees.
DOI, acting through its Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
55
(“BOEM”), proposed its first OCS renewable energy leasing regulations
56
in April 2009. The regulations established a program by which BOEM
could grant leases, easements, and rights-of-way for development of
57
offshore wind farms on the OCS.
The new system allowed BOEM to
offer both commercial and limited leases to interested parties through a
competitive leasing process, with a limited exception for non-competitive
58
leases.
Commercial leases convey all access and operational rights
necessary to produce, sell, and deliver power on a commercial scale over a
59
term of up to thirty years.
Limited leases give lessees access and
operational rights for activities that support the production of energy, but
they do not allow for the production of electricity or other energy products
for sale, distribution, or other commercial use exceeding the specific limit
60
61
set in the lease. These limited leases have a set term of five years.

54.
43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(2).
55.
The Obama Administration has changed the name of the agency
responsible for wind development twice since 2010. See DOI, Interior Department
Completes Reorganization of the Former MMS (Sept. 30, 2011)
(http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Interior-Department-CompletesReorganization-of-the-Former-MMS.cfm). Prior names include the Mineral
Management Service and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement. These entities will be referred to as “BOEM” throughout this article.
56.
See Renewable Energy and Alternate Uses of Existing Facilities on the
Outer Continental Shelf, 74 Fed. Reg. 19,638 (Apr. 29, 2009); see also Press Release,
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, “President Obama, Secretary Salazar
Announce Framework for Renewable Energy Development on the U.S. Outer
Continental Shelf” (Apr. 22, 2009) (available at www.boem.gov/boemnewsroom/press-releases/2009/press0422.aspx)[hereinafter Renewable Energy Rule].
57.
30 C.F.R. §§ 585.200 – 585.206 (WL current through Oct. 1, 2012).
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at § 585.200.
Id. at § 585.235.
Id. at § 585.112.
Id. at § 585.236
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BOEM initiates its competitive leasing process by publishing in the
Federal Register a “Call for Information and Nominations” for leasing in
62
Interested parties have forty-five days from the date of
specific areas.
63
publication to comment.
These comments must include the area of
interest, a general description of the lease purpose, a proposed schedule,
and all available and relevant data regarding renewable energy and
64
environmental conditions in the area of interest.
BOEM then reviews
this information and uses it to prepare a lease. Once the lease is prepared,
65
the agency holds a competitive auction to award it.
BOEM leasing includes a multilayered fee schedule, including
66
67
68
annual rent, annual project easement rent, annual operating fee, and
69
financial assurance requirements. Rental rates are set at a per-acre rate
70
71
for the project and a per-mile rate for any transmission easement. The
annual operating fee formula is based on the value of the anticipated
annual power output of a project in a regional wholesale power market
72
times an operating fee rate. The actual cost of the various fees will vary
by location, and size of the project, but can easily amount to millions of
dollars annually. The auction process BOEM intends to use in
competitive lease situations will require up-front bonus payments to
73
BOEM that will add further to the cost for the developer.

62.
Id. at § 585.211(a).
63.
Id.
64.
Id. at § 585.213.
65.
Id. at § 585.220(a) [These auctions can take the form of either sealed
bidding, ascending bidding, two-state bidding (combination of sealed and ascending
bidding), or multiple-factor bidding.]
66.
Id. at § 585.503.
67.
Id. at § 585.508.
68.
Id. at § 585.506.
69.
Id. at § 585.515.
70.
Id. at § 585.503.
71.
Id. at § 585.508.
72.
Id. at § 585.506.
73.
BOEM, PowerPoint, Fiscal Terms, slides 1 – 13 (Rhode
Island/Massachusetts Public Seminar Presentation Jan. 13, 2013) (available at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Renewable_Energy_Program/State_Activities
/RIMA%20Public%20Seminar%20Fiscal%20Terms%2011513.pdf) (Illustrating BOEM’s
approach to fee collection as presented to potential bidders for leases off Rhode Island);
BOEM, PowerPoint, Fiscal Terms and Auction, Format slides 1 – 38 (Rhode
Island/Massachusetts Task Force Meeting Aug. 8, 2012) (available at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Renewable_Energy_Program/State_Activities
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Deficiencies in BOEM’s original 2009 leasing program became
clear in its first year of implementation. The agency, applying many of
the policies common to oil and gas leasing, had created a system that by
any standard was slow and expensive, especially so for a new industry
74
BOEM responded to wind industry
struggling to enter the market.

/RI%20Fiscal%20Terms%20and%20Auction%20Format%20Update%208-Aug2012%20.pdf) (For an illustration of BOEM’s auction format and expectations regarding
bonus payments, see this presentation to potential Rhode Island bidders).
74.
The offshore wind development industry, through a trade association,
offered a detailed critique of the original BOEM regulations. The Offshore Wind
Development Coalition called on BOEM to change the regulations to (1) shorten the sevento-nine year timelines for leasing and permitting, largely by amending the regulations to
allow offshore wind developers to obtain provisional leases designed to protect their
interests while they collect the data needed for comprehensive Environmental Impact
Statements (“EIS”); (2) change the governance structure to account for differences between
oil and gas leasing and renewable energy development; and (3) remove the requirement
that offshore wind developers pay operating fees based upon statewide average power
price. See Letter from Jim Lanard, President of Offshore Wind Development Coalition, to
Michael Bromwich, Director of BOEM (Sept. 9, 2010) (on file with authors). The first
element of the industry’s critique centered on the amount of time the agency would take to
approve leasing and permitting. The industry association pointed out that the prolonged
process discourages up-front investment, which in turn prevents developers from receiving
the funding necessary to reach the operational phase of their projects. Id. at 4-5. Inability
to obtain initial financing leaves developers to personally cover pre-construction
expenditures before projects can generate revenue. Given uncertain prospects of success,
inability to secure investment capital is a huge disincentive to entities interested in
developing offshore wind infrastructure. Id. at 4-7. The association urged BOEM to
shorten the timeline for offshore wind development by consolidating its EIS requirements.
Id. at 6-8. Regulations at the time required two separate National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”) reviews—one to evaluate the effects of issuing a lease and another to
evaluate the effects of approving a Construction and Operating Plan. The industry stated
that developers would be willing to hold off on acquiring a full commercial lease and
instead accept a provisional lease if doing so would allow them to complete a site-specific
EIS more quickly. Id. However, under the regulations, developers who did this would not
be protected from conflicting claims asserted later in the site assessment process. Investors
would be unwilling to support a project without assurance that they were likely to receive a
return in the future. The association estimated that this leasing adjustment would cut two
years from the seven-plus year leasing timeline. Id. at 7. The industry’s critique called on
BOEM to streamline its leasing process by reorganizing the governance structure to
account for the differences between oil and gas activities and offshore wind development.
The industry argued that the risks associated with oil and gas leasing are significantly
higher than those associated with offshore wind. Id. at 8. It noted that the reorganization
that created BOEM would require the agency to devote a significant amount of time to oil
and gas activities, likely to the detriment of the Administration’s renewable energy
program. Id. at 8-9. It called on DOI to reorganize its leasing agencies to ensure that
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objections by creating the “Smart from the Start” program in November
75
The agency acknowledged
2010, and rewriting its regulations, in part.
that “substantial concerns have been raised about the prospect of a sevento ten-year timeline for a new and untested approval process” and
proposed three new initiatives to help facilitate the siting, leasing, and
76
construction of new offshore wind projects.
These initiatives included
simplifying the approval process where there is a single qualified
developer, identifying priority Wind Energy Areas for development,
simplifying the NEPA process at the leasing stage to allow use of an EA
rather than an EIS, and processing applications to build offshore
77
transmission lines.
The Smart from the Start initiative streamlined certain aspects of
the offshore wind development process. Updated regulations regarding
non-competitive leases may save lessees between six-to-twelve months of
78
delay.
BOEM’s identification of Wind Energy Areas off the coasts of
renewable energy received the attention it deserved. Id. Finally, the industry called on
BOEM to reform the royalty regulations to ensure that operating fee charges would not
hinder project financing. Id. at 10. The regulations based revenue estimates on statewide
average power prices, which include and therefore vary with fossil fuel prices. By keying
wind revenue estimates to oil and gas, the regulations result in an increase in offshore wind
farms’ operating fees, if the cost of generating power from fossil fuels rises. This would
occur even if the wind farm’s actual revenues remained constant. Id. The industry
association explained that such a pricing structure unnecessarily hinders wind development
by causing rising operating fees to absorb potential revenues and slowing development and
investment. Id. The association recommended that BOEM offer greater flexibility to
offshore wind farms by exempting them from the existing fee calculation or by providing
operating fee holidays. Id.
75.
DOI, Salazar Launches ‘Smart from the Start’ Initiative to Speed Offshore
Wind Energy Development off the Atlantic Coast (Nov. 23, 2010),
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Launches-Smart-from-the-Start-Initiativeto-Speed-Offshore-Wind-Energy-Development-off-the-Atlantic-Coast.cfm.
76.
See Press Release, DOI, Frequently Asked Questions: ‘Smart from the
Start’
Atlantic
OCS
Offshore
Wind
Initiative
(available
at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=73
317) [hereinafter Smart from the Start Press Release].
77.
BOEM, Press Release, Frequently Asked Questions: ‘Smart from the Start’
Atlantic
OCS
Offshore
Wind
Initiative,
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=73
318 (accessed April 17, 2013).
78.
Press Release, DOI, Salazar Launches ‘Smart from the Start’ Initiative to
Speed Offshore Wind Energy Development off the Atlantic Coast (Nov. 23, 2010)
(available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Launches-Smart-from-theStart-Initiative-to-Speed-Offshore-Wind-Energy-Development-off-the-Atlantic-Coast.cfm)
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Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and
Virginia will also allow it to more efficiently assess development
proposals and applications. Jumpstarting the NEPA process, the agency
has initiated Environmental Assessments (“EAs”) in these areas to
determine the potential effects that leasing and site assessment activities
79
may have on the environment, and some of these EAs have already
produced results.
BOEM has issued two commercial wind leases, one off the coast
80
of Massachusetts, and one off the coast of Delaware. The Department is
also moving forward with the competitive lease sales for Wind Energy
81
Areas off Virginia, Rhode Island and Massachusetts.
The competitive
82
auctions will offer nearly 278,000 acres for wind energy development.
The agency is also planning additional lease sales for Wind Energy Areas

[hereinafter Smart from the Start Press Release] supra n. 51, at 1 (BOEM’s original
regulations provided two distinct processes applicable to non-competitive leases. One set
allowed BOEM to publish a single public notice before awarding a lease to a party that
submitted an unsolicited request for a non-competitive lease. The second set applied when
only a single party responded to a Call for Information and Nominations. Regulations
governing this situation required BOEM to publish a second public notice ensuring the
absence of competition before proceeding with the award process. These regulations were
streamlined in October 2011); see 76 Fed. Reg. 64432, 64741 (Oct. 18, 2011); see also 77
Fed. Reg. 1019 (Jan. 9, 2012).
79.
Ken Salazar, Speech, AWEA Offshore Wind Conference Remarks (U.S.
DOI,
Baltimore,
MD.
Oct.
11,
2011)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.doi.gov/news/speeches/AWEA-Offshore-Wind-Conference.cfm).
80.
BOEM,
Cape
Wind,
http://www.boem.gov/Renewable-EnergyProgram/Current-Projects/Index.aspx (accessed April 17, 2013) (The lease offshore of
Massachusetts is located on Horseshoe Shoal in Nantucket Sound. The project will consist
of 130 wind turbine generators with a total capacity of 468 megawatts. BOEM issued the
lease offshore of Delaware for a 96,430 acre area. Bluewater Wind Delaware LLC, the

lessee, will have the right to submit one or more plans for the development of an
offshore wind facility.)
81.
DOI, Press Release, Interior Announces First-Ever Renewable Energy
Lease Sales on the Outer Continental Shelf (Nov. 30, 2012) (available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/interior-announces-first-ever-renewableenergy-lease-sales-on-the-outer-continental-shelf.cfm).
82.
Id. At the time of publication, BOEM had announced its intention to
hold the first offshore renewable energy lease sale for two leases off the coast of
Massachusetts and Rhode Island on July 31, 2013. DOI, BOEM to Auction Nearly
165,000 Acres Offshore Rhode Island and Massachusetts for Wind Energy
Development in July (June 4, 2013), http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/interiorannounces-first-offshore-renewable-energy-lease-sale.cfm.
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83

offshore of New Jersey, Maryland, and Massachusetts, determining
industry interest in three areas offshore North Carolina, and obtaining
84
suggestions and recommendations for EAs of those areas.
The agency is also processing a lease request from a company that
has received Department of Energy (“DOE”) funding to develop floating
wind turbines that can operate in deep water on the Outer Continental
85
Shelf off Maine.
BOEM issued a "finding of no competitive interest"
for the project last December, and the company is preparing its
86
Construction Operations Plan.
Once Interior receives that plan, the
87
agency will conduct an Environmental Impact Statement.
BOEM is expecting to receive a lease request for a site off Oregon
from another company that received DOE funding to develop floating
88
wind turbine technology.
It is also carrying out planning and
environmental work associated with a proposed mid-Atlantic wind energy
transmission line along the East Coast. The “Atlantic Wind Connection”
would run from southern Virginia to northern New Jersey, transmitting to
the onshore grid power produced by wind facilities off New Jersey,
89
Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia. The project would bring as much as
90
7,000 MW of wind turbine capacity to the grid.
83.
BOEM, New Jersey, http://www.boem.gov/Renewable-EnergyProgram/State-Activities/New-Jersey.aspx (accessed April 17, 2013)); BOEM,
Maryland,
http://www.boem.gov/Renewable-Energy-Program/StateActivities/Maryland.aspx (accessed April 17, 2013); BOEM, Massachusetts,
http://www.boem.gov/Renewable-Energy-Program/StateActivities/Massachusetts.aspx (accessed April 17, 2013).
84.
BOEM, North Carolina, http://www.boem.gov/Renewable-EnergyProgram/State-Activities/North-Carolina.aspx (accessed April 17, 2013).
85.
EERE Network News, Interior Department to Review Proposal for
First U.S. Floating Wind Turbine (Aug. 15, 2012), (available at
http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/news/news_detail.cfm/news_id=18554).
86.
BOEM, BOEM Announces Finding of No Competitive Interest for
Commercial wind Leasing Offshore Maine (Dec. 18, 2012) (available at
http://www.boem.gov/BOEM-Newsroom/Press-Releases/2012/press12182012.aspx).
87.
Id.
88.
Department
of
Energy,
Offshore
Wind
Technology,
https://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/offshore_wind.html.
89.
Atlantic
Wind
Connection,
About
Us,
http://atlanticwindconnection.com/awc-intro/ (accessed April 17, 2013).
90.
BOEM, Regional Proposals: The Atlantic Wind Connection, iii
(August
10,
2011)
(available
at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Renewable_Energy_Program/State_Acti
vities/AWCApplication.pdf); see also Atlantic Wind Connection, supra n. 64.
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B. Encouraging Agencies to Coordinate the Siting Process
The Obama Administration’s efforts to promote offshore wind
development have included efforts to press the many agencies with ocean
resource-related jurisdiction to actively coordinate their pieces of the
siting process. BOEM has entered into Memoranda of Understanding
(“MOUs”) with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”),
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), and the
DOEto resolve key interagency tensions.
BOEM entered into its first wind development-related MOU in
91
April 2009 with FERC. Under this agreement, the agencies agreed that
BOEM would have exclusive jurisdiction over non-hydrokinetic
renewable energy projects, like wind, on the OCS, while FERC would
retain exclusive jurisdiction to issue licenses and exemptions for
92
hydrokinetic projects on the OCS.
This agreement was purely
jurisdictional, but it conclusively established BOEM as the authority for
93
offshore wind leases.
A year later, in June 2010, DOI entered into an MOU with the
94
DOE stating that “it is a national priority to work to ensure the
expeditious development of offshore wind,” and vowed to collaborate to
95
develop attainable development goals on the OCS.
This collaboration
culminated in a joint report issued in 2011, which laid out a detailed action
plan to achieve ten GW of deployed offshore wind generating capacity by
96
2020 and fifty-two GW by 2030.

91.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Memorandum of
Understanding between the U.S. Department of the Interior and Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (April 9, 2009) (available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/majord-reg/mou/mou-doi.pdf).
92.
Id. at 1.
93.
See Todd Griest, Harnessing the Ocean’s Power: Opportunities in
Renewable Ocean Energy Resources, 16 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 395, 410-412 (2011)
(Provides a discussion of the circumstances necessitating the FERC MOU).
94.
DOI, Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Department of
the Interior and the U.S. Department of Energy for the Coordinated Deployment of
Offshore Wind and Marine and Hydrokinetic Energy Technologies on the United
States Outer Continental Shelf
(June 28, 2010) (available at
www.doi.gov/whatwedo/energy/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=3704
0).
95.
Id. at 2.
96.
See National Offshore Wind Strategy, supra n. 27, at i.
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BOEM entered into a MOU with NOAA in May 2011 to set the
97
roles the agencies will play in the licensing process. BOEM will be the
lead agency on any NEPA analysis related to offshore energy on the OCS,
98
and NOAA agreed to provide timely consultation when necessary.
NOAA also agreed to work with BOEM and DOE to effectuate their
strategies and eliminate duplication of their efforts in developing the
99
OCS.
C. Wind Technology Research and Development Grants
DOE has begun issuing grants to promote advanced ocean wind
technology demonstration projects. In 2011, DOE funded nineteen
technology development projects intended to improve the engineering
modeling tools necessary to reduce the cost of offshore facilities and to
100
design the next generation of offshore turbines.
DOE also invested in
twenty-three projects created to remove market barriers limiting the
availability of offshore wind along the coasts and in the Great Lakes
101
region.
DOE expanded its funding of offshore wind development in
December 2012, announcing that it had partnered with seven advanced
technology demonstration projects that are developing “breakthrough”
offshore wind energy generation technology that will reduce the cost of
102
offshore wind.
DOE is on track to award each of these seven projects
up to four million dollars ($4,000,000) to complete phase one of a twophase program. Under this initial segment, grantees will develop and
propose the engineering, site evaluation, and planning aspects of their
103
projects.
DOE will then choose up to three grantees to advance to the

97.
NOAA, Memorandum of Understanding on Coordination and
Collaboration Regarding Outer Continental Shelf Energy Development and
Environmental Stewardship between the U.S. Department of Interior and the U.S.
Department
of
Commerce
(May
19,
2011)
(available
at
www.noaa.gov/stories2011/pdfs/05232011_NOAA-BOEMRE-MOU.pdf).
98.
Id. at 4.
99.
Id. at 5.
100.
DOE,
Offshore
Wind
Technology
,
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/offshore_wind.html (accessed Mar. 22, 2013).
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Id.
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second phase, under which the projects will work to achieve commercial
104
operation by 2017.
D. Investment and Production Tax Credits for Wind Energy Development
On January 1, 2013, Congress extended the renewable energy
Investment Tax Credit (“ITC”) and Production Tax Credit (“PTC”) that
105
had expired on December 31, 2012.
The ITC, which allows for an upfront tax credit equivalent to 30% of capital investments made in offshore
wind development projects, serves as a substantial incentive for
106
investors.
The ITC extension for ocean wind will apply to projects that
107
start construction by January 1, 2014.
Ocean wind developers can also
elect to forego the ITC in favor of the PTC, which was also extended on
January 1, 2013. The PTC allows wind farm owners to receive a 2.2 cent
per-kilowatt-hour tax credit for the first ten years of production on energy
108
sold to third parties.
III. HISTORICAL MODELS – GOVERNMENT-PROPELLED
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIER
Well into the 20th century, United States policymaking on key
domestic and international matters was driven by the quest to control and
use the continent, to “settle” the West. The drive to build national and
personal wealth converged on the public lands. Policy reflected the
compelling, albeit romanticized vision of the public lands as an El Dorado
of opportunity for the yeoman farmer or rancher, miner, trapper, logger,
and small businessman, who, if willing to work tirelessly, could make an

104.
105.

Id.
Matthew L. Wald, The Wind Industry Gets to Draw Another Breath,
New
York
Times,
(Jan.
3,
2013)
(available
at
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/the-wind-industry-gets-to-draw-anotherbreath/) [hereinafter Wald].
106.
Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE), Business
Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC) (Jan. 3, 2013) (available at
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US02F).
107.
AWEA,
Federal
Policy,
http://www.awea.org/issues/federal_policy/index.cfm (accessed April 17, 2013).
108.
Id.;
AWEA,
Production
Tax
Credit
PTC,
http://awea.org/issues/federal_policy/upload/PTC_April-2011.pdf (accessed May 30,
2013).

ARE OCEAN WIND TURBINES LIKE HOMESTEADS?

117

honorable life on the vast open landscape. Millions of acres awaited
enterprising young men and women, whose only chore was to take and
cultivate the natural bounty of the land. The western territories clamored
for settlers to populate their landscapes and propel them into statehood.
The federal government, which owned most of the land west of
the Mississippi, was integral in encouraging western settlement. As one
historian wrote: “Land in its seemingly inexhaustible abundance stands at
the heart of American history, intertwining Americans’ material lives and
109
cultural perception.”
The philosophy of the 19th century was that it
was the government’s responsibility not to hold on to and manage western
lands, but to disseminate them to the American people who would work
and live off of the lands. In the early 1800s, the federal government
offered the public lands for sale at extremely low prices. Squatters who
had claimed land without government approval were often offered an even
110
lower price to purchase the lands they had settled.
When sales
declined, as the most arable lands were claimed, the government turned to
outright giveaways to those who would promise to live on and work the
land. To prompt major capital investment, the government granted vast
areas of land for the building of bridges, dams, canals, railroads, and
universities. Miners were offered land in exchange for the development of
the nation’s mineral wealth.
The following section discusses several of the most prominent
government programs encouraging private development of the American
West through disposal of some or all of the government’s ownership
inlands and resources. We also highlight related initiatives to use public
funds and authority to encourage private development of public lands.
111
These programs all had problems that others have explored in depth.
We cite these programs because, simply, they made development happen.
Lessons learned from these historical models may be applied to
development of the modern frontier of renewable ocean wind energy.

109.
Robert Bunting, Introduction, the West and Its Forests, 38 J.of the
West 5 (Vol. 4 1999).
110.
Paul Wallace Gates, History of Public Land Law Development, Chapter
XV, 387 – 390 (1968).
111.
See generally Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The
Unbroken Past of the American West (1988); Charles Wilkinson, Crossing the Next
Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future of the West (1992); Marc Reisner, Cadillac
Desert: The American West and its Disappearing Water (1986).
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A. Homesteading the West
1. The 1862 Homestead Act
By the mid-1800s, much of the best farmland west of the
Appalachians had been sold to settlers and speculators. Eastern cities,
growing with immigration and industrialization, grappled with a large
class of unemployed immigrant poor who could not afford to buy land,
112
even at the substantially reduced prices offered by the government.
The National Land Reform movement, which espoused the theory of
natural rights, including the right of every man to a share of the soil,
113
pressed Congress for legislation granting free land to settlers.
Reform
advocates believed that land grants would draw westward the
overabundance of jobless and working poor who depressed wages,
weakened the bargaining position of labor, and presented an array of
114
social challenges.
Detractors argued that free land would discriminate against early
settlers who had paid for their lands, be unfair to veterans (who received
land grants by diminishing the value of their lands), provide a boon to
western settlers beyond any value given to eastern settlers, depress land
values, enable capitalists using dummy settlers to accumulate large tracts,
give unfair advantages to foreigners, and drastically reduce the income
115
from public lands.
The politics of slavery greatly complicated federal
land policy, as slave states resisted changes that would weaken their
116
economic and political position
Out West, while some speculators and
business people feared opening the public lands to free settlement, the
117
pressure for progress and growth was greater.

112.
Id. at 391-92.
113.
Id. at 390-93; see also Karin P. Sheldon, How Did We Get Here?
Looking to History to Understand Conflicts in Public Land Governance Today, 23
Publ. Land & Res. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2002) (“The fine hand of Locke is visible in the
Homestead Act. By work and sweat an individual could end up as a property owner the Jeffersonian ideal of the “hardy yeoman.” This concept of the rugged individual
taming the wilderness to create the basic unit of democracy is one of our most
compelling and enduring ideas.”).
114.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 391.
115.
Id. at 393.
116.
Id. at 392.
117.
Id. at 392-93.
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Finally, in 1862, when the southern states could no longer object,
Congress enacted the Homestead Act. The act gave away the public lands
in 160-acre parcels to settlers who would live on and farm the land for five
118
years.
After farming the land for five years, the settler could obtain fee
119
All surveyed lands on which Indian
simple title for a small filing fee.
title had been extinguished were eligible for settlement. In 1880, the act
120
was expanded to apply to unsurveyed lands.
Between 1868 and 1904, nearly 100 million acres were settled
under the Homestead Act, many by the small farmers the Homestead Act
was expressly intended to benefit. Between 1880 and 1900, 500,000
121
farms were created.
The Homestead Act achieved its purpose of
disposing of the public lands in the name of progress, but not without
serious problems. Most of the land that remained available for
homesteading was semi-arid and impossible to make productive in
122
farming units of 160 acres or less.
Indeed, the Homestead Act has been
criticized by many as being wholly misinformed by the farming
experience of the green and humid lands in the east, which did not take
into account the realities of the Great Plains and Great American
123
Desert.
Administration of the Homestead Act was rife with fraud as
homesteaders perjured themselves to obtain multiple claims, or larger
124
claims.
Smaller farms that could not make a living either went bust or
were purchased by larger landholdings.
Lands granted under the Homestead Act did not always benefit
actual settlers. Speculation, which had been a major concern under the
land sale system, was rampant, and Congress’ failure to repeal cash sale
laws along with the Homestead Act meant speculators could buy up the
125
choice lands at $1.25/acre just ahead of free settlement.
Other
problems arose as homesteads were sometimes used as a pretense to strip
118.
Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161 et seq. (repealed 1976),
http://www.nps.gov/home/historyculture/upload/mw,pdf,homestead%20act,txt.pdf.
119.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 394.
120.
Id.
121.
George Cameron Coggins, Charles F. Wilkinson and John D. Leshy,
Federal Public Land and Resources 79 (5th ed. 2002).
122.
Gates supra n. 85, at 399; David Getches, Water Wrongs: Why Can’t
We Get it Right the First Time?, 34 Envtl. L. 1, 8 (2004).
123.
Karin P. Sheldon, supra n. 87, at 8; Charles F. Wilkinson, supra n. 111,
at 22.
124.
Gates supra n. 85, at 477-78.
125.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 395; see also id. at 436.
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the public lands of valuable timber and other resources with no intent to
126
Some large livestock interests gamed
farm the land or obtain a patent.
the homestead laws, entering lands necessary to control water in
downstream regions, effectively shutting out other settlers, and using the
127
intervening public rangelands as de facto personal ranches.
Indian
Tribes also fell victim to the country’s haste to dispose of the public lands,
as treaties were breached and many tribes were coerced to break up
reservations into allotments for individual tribal owners, which were then
128
often purchased or obtained by other devices by non-tribal interests.
For all its drawbacks, the Homestead Act worked. The law
expanded development across the western frontier, with millions of acres
129
settled.
At the close of the homestead era, the landscape of the
American West was forever reshaped.
2. The Desert Land Act
The Homestead Act was more successful in the areas east of the
100th meridian where rainfall was adequate to grow crops than on the arid
public land to the west, which often needed large expenditures of capital
130
to bring water onto the land through irrigation.
The required capital
131
investment discouraged farming, especially small blocks.
In response,

126.
Id. at 395-96; 417-19.
127.
Id. at 466-67.
128.
Id. at 463-66.
129.
See id. at 480-82 (detailing some of the successes for small farm
creation).
130.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 401. Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water,
Aridity and the Growth of the American West (1985) Reisner, supra n. 111, at 43
(“Neither Congress nor the General Land Office, which was responsible for
administering the acts, could ever comprehend that the relative success of the land
program east of the Mississippi River had less to do with the perseverance of the
settlers or the wisdom of the legislation than with the forgiving nature of the climate.
In the East, virtually every acre received enough rainfall, except during years of
extraordinary drought to grow most anything that didn’t mind the soil and
temperatures.”).
131.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 401; Reisner, supra n. 111, at 48; Wallace
Stegner, Beyond the Hundredth Meridian (1954)(“It was clear that individual
initiative and individual labor and individual capital were inadequate to develop the
irrigation works needed on an arid-belt farm unless the farm were located high on the
headwaters of a small stream. It was equally clear that the earliest development would
be and had been on these high small streams, and that on the larger and lower reaches
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and with little attempt to address the pitfalls of and criticisms lodged
132
Congress passed the Desert Land Act of
against the Homestead Act,
133
1877.
John Wesley Powell and others questioned the wisdom of the
act, reporting that more than three-fourths of claims on desert lands would
require investment of a million dollars or more to achieve the necessary
134
irrigation.
Under the Desert Land Act, a settler could claim up to 640 acres at
135
$0.25/acre and could patent the land upon proof of irrigation.
Thirtythree million acres were entered under the Desert Land Act, though only
10 million acres were patented—evidence of the difficulty in meeting the
136
irrigation requirements.
The act was largely unsuccessful in
encouraging irrigation and farming on the desert lands. Most lands were
used for stock grazing, or to secure water rights, and the majority ended up
137
in the hands of large corporations.
For those claims that were patented,
many were based on fraud. Stories are common of settlers perjuring
themselves with testimony of irrigation when only a single cup of water
138
had been brought to and poured on the claim.
3. The Stock-Raising Homestead Act
In 1916, with most good (and a lot of poor), land homesteaded,
139
the chief use of the remaining “open” public lands was for grazing.
Still in the disposal mindset, and against the objection of cattlemen who
lamented the breakup and fencing of the western range, Congress enacted
the last of the great homesteading acts — the Stock-Raising Homestead

where cultivable land was much more extensive and the growing season longer the
cost of dams and ditches was prohibitive.”); Id. at 228.
132.
Id. at 638.
133.
43 U.S.C. §§ 321-339 (repealed 1976).
134.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 639.
135.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 401.
136.
Id. at 401, 642. See Worster, supra n. 130, at 156 (“Simply handing a
settler, or purported settler, a square mile of desert with the requirement that he bring
water to it, as the Desert Land Act did, was a snare and a delusion.”)
137.
Id.
138.
See id. at 639-41. See Reisner, supra n. 111, at 45 (“As for the Desert
Land Act and the Timber and Stone Act, they could not have promoted land
monopoly and corruption more efficiently if they had been expressly designed for that
purpose.”)
139.
Id. at 516 - 517.
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Act of 1916—allowing the entry of 640 acres designated as valuable for
140
Settlers were required to invest at least $1.25/acre in
grazing.
permanent improvements, such as fencing, in exchange for a patent to the
141
land.
Fifty million acres were entered under the law, though over half
142
Again, while the act achieved its
that much was eventually abandoned.
goal of land disposals, it too was plagued by speculators and fraud.
Settlers making an honest attempt at stock-raising were often forced give
up the land or sell to large ranch holdings, as 640 acres proved too little
143
for a viable business operation.
It also broke up what had once been
open range and contributed significantly to its deterioration through over144
grazing on the eve of the Dust Bowl and Great Depression era.
B. Grants to Railroads – Building a Transcontinental Infrastructure
The United States heavily invested its public lands toward the
145
construction of railroads.
Originally, Congress had merely granted
rights-of-way to railroads. By the middle of the 19th century it was
apparent that the cost of building a transcontinental railroad system would
require the railroad companies to raise substantially more capital than the
private markets were prepared to contribute. The government would need
to do more to capitalize the effort to tie the nation’s coasts together. The
solution of the day was to provide free land to the railroads, though
opponents voiced concern over the massive quantities of land that would
be removed from the public domain and made unavailable for
146
homesteading.
Between 1862 and 1871, the government promised between 100
million and 110 million acres of public lands to the transcontinental
147
railroads directly to be sold to finance construction of the railroads.

140.
43 U.S.C. § 291-301 (repealed 1976).
141.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 517.
142.
Id. at 528-29.
143.
Id. at 519-21.
144.
Id. at 521-22.
145.
See id. at 341-56 (Before the large land grants to support the
construction of railroads, the United States experimented in land grants to support the
building of roads, bridges, and canals in the Ohio territories and beyond).
146.
Id. at 360-61.
147.
Id. at 377. Reisner, supra n. 111, at 39 (“To call it a bonanza is to
understate the matter significantly. The railroad land grants were a gift the size of
California plus the major part of Montana”).
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Generally, the odd numbered sections of land in a band as wide as forty
miles along the railroad corridor were granted, resulting in a checkerboard
land ownership pattern with even numbered sections held by the
148
government and odd numbered sections granted to the railroads.
Where land within the railroad grant area had already been settled or was
promised to the states, the railroads were permitted to select other in lieu
149
lands.
The primary limitation on the railroad’s selection was that no
150
mineral lands could be selected.
The area of land granted to the railroads varied by grant, and over
time, with earlier grants being generally narrower than later grants, and
more land being made available for those portions of the railroad corridor
151
that would be more difficult and costly to construct.
In addition to land
grants, the railroads also received favorable federal loans, with a first
mortgage to the United States, and thirty-year government bonds for each
mile of railroad constructed, with the loan and bond amount to depend on
152
the difficulty and cost of construction.
Railroad land grants worked. Transcontinental railroads were
built. Construction of the railroads encouraged continued immigration and
settlement, including establishment of many “railroad towns” to support
153
construction along their routes.
The railroads also facilitated western
154
tourism and were integral to establishment of major national parks.
For all their successes, the railroad grants also gave rise to a
number of difficulties. While the railroads were required to sell their land
grants to settlers within a certain time period—generally three years—or
the lands would revert to federal ownership, the railroads often delayed
155
sale by postponing required surveys.
The railroads also found creative
ways to “dispose” of lands by mortgaging them to affiliates and thus
avoided returning much of the land to the federal government or selling
156
the land at reasonable prices to interested settlers.
In other instances,
railroads were given the right to select lands from areas not along the

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Coggins, supra n. 94, at 91.
Gates, supra n. 85 at 364.
Id.
Id. at 362-86.
Id.
Coggins, supra n. 94, at 92.
Id.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 365-66.
Id.
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railroad corridor, putting areas off limits to settlement that received none
of the benefits of the railroad’s construction. Large areas of land were
withdrawn that were neither settled nor returned to the government as
157
railroads delayed in selecting lands to avoid tax payments.
Western public and political sentiment, which had at first
clamored for railroad grants, turned sour as westerners came to view the
railroad companiess monopolistic land barons with too much control of
158
too much western land.
Railroad companies were criticized for holding
prime land and selling only at high prices, even after the railroads had
159
been financed and constructed.
One commentator has described the
160
The
railroads as “corporate throwback[s] to colonial proprietors.”
checkerboard pattern of land ownership has created great practical and
land management challenges for government and private landowners.
The legacy of railroad grants is a mixed one. Successful in tying
together the nation’s transportation and commerce, railroad grants created
contemporary obstacles for competing settlers and land users, and modern
difficulties for federal land managers and private owners of checkerboard
sections.
C. The Reclamation Act – Federal Support for Irrigated Farming
The Desert Land Act had opened larger parcels of arid lands to
entry, but it did not achieve its goal of encouraging western farmers to
develop private irrigation systems to make the lands productive for
farming. By the 1880s, it became apparent that government support
would be necessary to construct large-scale water diversion and storage
infrastructure if much of the arid west was to be settled.

157.
Id. at 366-67.
158.
Id. at 454-56; 379-81. Reisner, supra n. 111 at 39 (“The deeded lands
usually paralleled the railroad’s track; reproduced on maps, they resembled jet streams
flowing in reverse. Anyone who bought land from the railroads would be utterly
dependent on them for getting his harvests to eastern markets and receiving supplies
in return. When the time came to set rates, the railroads could charge pretty much
what they pleased”).
159.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 396 (Up to 127 million acres of lands within 50
miles of the railroads was closed to homesteading as a result of the railroad grants). .
160.
Sheldon, supra n. 96, at 10.
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In 1888, Congress funded an irrigation survey to identify reservoir
161
sites throughout the West. Congress withdrew dam sites from entry,
but the survey activity resulted in a rush of land claims by speculators
intent on seizing the lands that would be made most productive through
162
163
irrigation projects.
In 1894, under the Carey Act,
Congress offered
the western states up to a million acres of federal land if they would
develop irrigation projects to make those lands productive within 10 years.
A million acres were patented under the Carey Act, mostly in Idaho and
Wyoming, but the act did not result in the wide-scale irrigation projects
164
envisioned by Congress.
Finally, in 1902, after much lobbying by irrigation and settlement
proponents, Congress resolved to directly fund irrigation projects under
165
the Reclamation Act, using revenues derived from sale of public lands.
Congress gave the Bureau of Reclamation authority under the
166
Reclamation Act to reserve dam sites from the public domain.
Opponents, generally from the eastern states states, argued that the
program was socialistic and an unwarranted use of federal funds and an
167
unfair western hoarding of public land revenues.
They also feared
168
competition from millions of acres of newly irrigated farmlands.
By 1906, projects had begun in fifteen states to irrigate 2.5
169
million acres.
The original intent of the Reclamation Act was that the
government would put up the capital to begin large-scale irrigation
projects, sale of irrigated lands would finance the projects, and water users
would repay the construction costs over time, as well as pay the cost for
maintenance of the facilities. Unfortunately, in most cases, land sales and
water user fees were not sufficient to repay construction costs, or at least

161.
Thomas H. Pacheco, Indian Bedlands Claims: A Need to Clear the
Waters, 15 Harv. Envt. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1991); see also Utah Div. of State Lands v.
U.S., 482 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1987) (discussing history of 1888 act and reservation of
dam sites).
162.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 661-62.
163.
43 U.S.C. §§ 641-48.
164.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 647-50.
165.
43 U.S.C. §§ 391-404; see also Gates, supra n. 85, at 655.
166.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 655; Paul Smyth, Conservation and Preservation
of Federal Public Resources: A History, 17 Fall Nat. Res. & Envt. 77, 78 (2002).
167.
Gates, supra n. 85 at 652-53; See Resiner, supra n. 111; Worster, supra
n. 130, at 160
168.
Gates, supra n. 85 at 652-653; . See Reisner, supra n. 111, at 114-115.
169.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 658 - 659.
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170

Extensions and debt forgiveness
not in the timeframe set by Congress.
171
were common.
Other unforeseen costs of massive dam building and water
diversion efforts would take longer to recognize, most significant among
them the environmental cost borne by fish and wildlife and those
172
dependent on them.
The appearance of abundant water encouraged
growth that itself had negative impacts on desert lands and habitats. The
economic development induced by Reclamation Act irrigation projects
may be sorely tested as rainfall and runoff patterns change with the
173
climate.
The financial shortcomings and environmental impacts of the
Reclamation Act tarnish, but do not negate, the fact that the Act was
largely successful in its original purpose of supporting the construction
and operation of hundreds of water projects across the West that are still
used today by farmers, ranchers, and communities for irrigation, flood
174
control, industrial and municipal water supply, and power generation.
The Reclamation Act was also instrumental in the creation of many
175
western communities.
Cheap hydropower and water security were
responsible, in no small part, for the expansion of agriculture, growth of
the industrial sector, and burgeoning western communities along western
176
rivers.
D. Hydropower Development and Licensing
The turn of the 20th century brought with it a new interest in
development of hydroelectric development, propelled by technological
advancement that made electric power transmission of 100 miles or more

170.
Id. at 655, 663-75.
171.
Id. at 686-88.
172.
See, e.g., Reisner, supra n. 111 ; Michael C. Blumm, Dam Removal in
the Pacific Northwest: Lessons for the Nation, 42 Envlt. L. 1043, 1045-46 (2012);
Getches, supra n. 95, at 5-6 (highlighting the environmental and social costs of large
dams); see generally Wilkinson, supra n. 111 , at ch. 5 (“The River was Crowded with
Salmon”).
173.
David Getches, supra n. 95, at 10-11; Wilkinson, supra n. 96, at 303.
174.
Getches at 2-3.
175.
Id. at 2-3.
176.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 692; David Getches, supra n. 95, at 5-6.
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177

During the push to construct dams under the
from dam sites possible.
Reclamation Act of 1902, little thought was given to the use of dam sites
178
to generate electric power.
Hydropower was a secondary value, helpful
to pay the costs of project development that were not being borne by the
179
farmers using irrigation water.
Early power plants were constructed to
convey irrigated water to users in the valleys, with the excess sold to
180
communities for municipal and industrial uses.
In time, the economic
value of hydropower became a dominant purpose of federal dam
development, resulting in projects such as Hoover Dam, Grand Coulee
181
Dam, and many others.
The value of public lands for hydropower projects generated
fierce debate between private interests and those who favored public use
of the resource. In 1920, Congress enacted the Federal Water Power Act,
which created the Federal Power Commission (FPC) (later the Federal
182
Energy Regulatory Commission).
The Commission was given power
to license private hydropower developments on all navigable waters across
the country, including on federal lands, subject to payment of rental fees to
183
the government for use of underlying public lands.
Congress permitted
the FPC to grant hydropower licenses for fifty years, responding to
pressure from developers to allow a lengthy period to recover investment
184
costs via power sales.

177.
Charles K. McFarland, The Federal Government and Water Power,
1901-1913: A Legislative Study in the Nascence of Regulation, 42 Land Economics
441, 441 (1966).
178.
Gates, supra n. 85, at 659.
179.
Id.
180.
Id. at 660.
181.
Id. at 685-890 (The eventual cost of constructing the Hoover Dam
would exceed all prior reclamation projects undertaken across the West. Similar
projects, though not as grand in scale, would be hastened by the Public Works funds
expended during the depression era).
182.
16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828.
183.
Id. at § 797(f).
184.
Id. at § 799.
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E. The General Mining Law of 1872 – Encouraging Development of
Mineral Resources
185

which
In 1872, Congress passed the General Mining Law,
generously offered to any industrious individual a land patent at $2.50 or
$5/acre for the discovery and development of valuable mineral
186
deposits.
The General Mining Law continued the United States policy
of “free mining” set out in the Mining Act of 1866, which permitted
discovery and patent of lode claims, and the Placer Act of 1870, which did
187
the same for placer claims.
The passage of both preceding laws was
controversial for permitting miners to gain ownership of valuable mineral
188
lands free of charge.
Supporters argued, however, that the laws were
189
necessary to resolve title disputes and encourage investment in mining.
The General Mining Law of 1872 made numerous substantive
190
changes to the earlier laws, but was enacted with little fanfare.
Mining
claims were limited to 20 acres, though a single miner could hold as many
claims as desired, so long as each included discovery of a valuable
191
deposit.
Even if a miner never took the land to patent, a miner with a
valid claim had the exclusive right to develop and sell the minerals
192
without royalty to the government.
When originally enacted, the
General Mining Law applied to all minerals other than coal, which was
already subject to auction and public sale. In 1920, the Mineral Leasing
Act removed oil and gas from the mining law and made it subject to
193
lease.
Common variety minerals, such as sand and gravel, were
194
removed from the application of the mining law in 1955.
There are approximately 1.1 million hardrock mining claims on 25
195
million acres of western public lands.
The law, to this day, permits the

185.
30 U.S.C. § 22.
186.
Charles Davis, American Federal Lands and Environmental Politics:
Politics as Usual or a New Ball Game? 19 Pub. Land & Res. L. Rev. 5, 7 (1998).
187.
GATES, supra n. 85, at 719-23.
188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Id. at 723.
191.
Id. at 77.
192.
Charles Davis, American Federal Lands and Environmental Politics:
Politics as Usual or a New Ball Game? 19 Pub. Land & Res. L. Rev. 5, 7 (1998).
193.
Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181, et seq.
194.
Common Varieties Act, 30 U.S.C. § 611.
195.
Wilkinson, supra n. 96, at 20, 33.
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discovery and extraction of hard rock minerals, precious metals, and gems
from the public lands without royalties to the federal government. The
law is distinctly controversial among public land laws, with ardent
champions and detractors. The latter argue the law is an unwarranted
giveaway to the mining industry, which has paid nothing to the
government for the right to exploit public mineral reserves for over a
196
century.
Critics point to environmental impacts caused by mining, such
197
as toxic tailings, and acid mine drainage.
The mining law’s backers argue that it supported development of
the nation’s industrial sector and economy for decades, and provides an
essential incentive for the exploration of mineral deposits, a business
198
fraught with risk.
Miners relying on the law discovered (and continue
to develop) some of the most valuable mineral deposits in the world. The
lure of gold and other precious metals was a major factor in drawing
settlers west and led to the establishment of countless western
communities. Environmental controls and practices have substantially
reduced the industry’s impacts on air, land and water, while providing
metals key to advanced technology, including copper and other minerals
199
used in renewable energy devices.
F. Federal Investments Encouraging Private Development
In tandem with the public land development laws discussed above,
the United States has historically spent public money to make public
resources easier to develop and more profitable to the private sector. The
examples offer a mix of lessons. The United States Forest Service long
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Land L. Rev. 1 (1988).
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Clean Water Act, Superfund, Endangered Species Act, and others, which have
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provided incentives to the timber industry by funding logging roads—
200
Public lands
often at considerable expense to the American taxpayer.
timber harvesting created western jobs, sustained communities, and got
forest products to markets, but certain logging practices are tied to a host
201
of environmental problems and land-use conflicts in the forests.
A different example is the United States’ investment in electric
transmission. From 1937 to 1977, the United States created the four
202
Power Marketing Administrations (“PMAs”),
each now under the
umbrella of the DOE, and each responsible for marketing power from
United States Army Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation
203
hydroelectric dams for a different region of the country.
The PMAs
have historically sold power to public entity customers for the express
204
purpose of encouraging regional economic development.
The PMAs
invested in the construction of thousands of miles of electric transmission
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Zeppos, Monitoring Government Disposition of Assets: Fashioning Regulatory
Substitutes for Market Controls, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1705, 1741 n.176 (1999) (listing
articles and writings critical of Forest Service road-building subsidies for the timber
industry). Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 675,
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(1999).
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connecting hydropower and other projects throughout the country to
205
market centers.
Finally, the United States has invested directly in other
infrastructure projects across the country, including construction of piers,
jetties, dredging, and other measures to modify coastal areas for the
206
benefit of shipping.
The public investment supports maritime trade, but
207
also serves key national interests in transportation and national defense.
The public lands disposal and development policies of the 19th
and early 20th centuries amounted in many ways to trial and error on the
grandest of scales. The policies of the day were built on the idea that
public lands and their wealth belonged to the people and should be used to
build the country. While critics have blasted the disposal programs and
other public land laws as having facilitated the “private exploitation of
208
209
public resources”
at the expense of the environment,
Indian
210
tribes,
and fiscal prudence, the various initiatives succeeded in using
the public lands to support development that the country wanted. National
policy was served by trading public resources for private action seen to
benefit the country.
IV. BORROWING FROM PAST EXPERIENCE: APPLYING LESSONS
LEARNED FROM HISTORICAL PUBLIC LAND LAWS TO
PROMOTION OF OCEAN WIND
Ocean wind development is stepping onto a stage largely set for a
different play. No law yet answers the question whether ocean wind
205.
See, e.g., Power Marketing Administrations (available at
http://www.allgov.com/departments/department-of-energy/power-marketingadministrations?agencyid=7424) (accessed April 17, 2013) (detailing assets of the
four PMAs).
206.
Corps of Engineers Dredging Policies, American Association of Port
Authorities, Corps of Engineers Dredging Policies (available at http://www.aapaports.org/Issues/content.cfm?ItemNumber=1096) (accessed April 17, 2013).
207.
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(1998).
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energy deserves to be governed differently from how we have chosen to
drill for oil or conserve whales. The latest executive branch statement on
national ocean policy barely mentions renewable energy, though the
President has otherwise made renewable energy development a key
feature of his Administration. So far, the idea of ocean wind development
is being treated as if it were essentially the same kind of policy problem
that the country has figured out how to handle under earlier laws.
Should we govern ocean wind development as if it is just another
royalty source or piece of industrial hardware out in the water? Or should
we govern ocean wind as urgently needed national energy infrastructure
that is essential to supply massive amounts of carbon-free electricity to the
power grid? Is ocean wind to be thought of as if it were a pier, jetty, oil
well, or pipeline—or is it something quite different, and more important?
When United States policymakers decide that the public lands hold
things urgently needed by the country, they generally write laws that make
it easy for citizens (and difficult for foreign interests) to use that thing in a
way that benefits the country, and earns a profit. Later, when
policymakers become aware that citizens are overusing or abusing the
resource in a way that hurts the country, they write laws that make it
harder to do the harmful thing. In between the “yin and yang” of action
and reaction, policymakers rely on process-oriented laws empowering
resource managers to mediate among competing interests involved with
particular sites, projects, or resources. For better or worse, it is generally
what we do.
Is the need to bring large amounts of wind energy onto the power
grid urgent enough today, or in a near tomorrow, that ocean wind farms
should be governed as if they were this era’s gold mine, homestead,
railroad, oil field, or dam site? If we think that development of ocean
wind resources may be as important to the country as dam projects were in
the early 20th century, or as vital as establishment of the transcontinental
rail network was in the 19th century, how should we govern ocean wind
development? If we are tempted to entertain the thought that the country
will need to act aggressively to develop its ocean wind resource in the
immediate future, do we have examples from our own experience that
suggest the kind of law-making that policymakers should be considering?
How much risk are we willing to take with the public’s ocean
resources in order to reduce risk to the atmosphere? How soon do we
need to decide? Our history of public land management does not resolve
these contemporary policy questions, and nothing is likely to happen until
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some consensus forms around the answers. The trajectory of climaterelated news and science suggests the country will need to decide soon,
and that the scale of any meaningful response will need to be big. The
success of ocean wind development in other countries, and the industry’s
early steps in the United States, each offer encouragement that a very large
industry can be created here, given the right conditions.
Our history suggests some features of lawmaking that have worked
in the past to achieve national resource development objectives. Where
we have succeeded most broadly, we have created private wealth from
public resources. We have transferred enough of the wealth-making
potential of public resources to private hands to stimulate investment by
private actors. Sometimes the public has augmented the value of the land
itself with direct investment, for example, with the Reclamation Act
projects. As Charles Wilkinson noted in his seminal work on natural
resource and public land policy, Crossing the Next Meridian:
Many of those policies had enormously beneficial effects
for the nation, or at least for the vastly larger non-Indian
population. The homesteading program, with all of its
abuses, is justly acclaimed as one of the most progressive
land distribution policies ever undertaken by any nation.
The almost incomprehensibly large subsidies to railroads
may well have been excessive, but it is hard to deny that
some extraordinary public incentive was required to
achieve the widely held objective of connecting the
coasts. Much the same is true with many of the early
large-scale reclamation projects. Federal capital was
necessary if the West was to be opened for the small
211
family farm.
In some cases, the country fully privatized resources that had been
public. Railroad land grants, homesteads, and mine sites were conveyed
in full to private hands—in exchange for investments of time, labor, and
money by private parties. Each of these sets of transactions had problems,
including fraud and unaddressed environmental and social externalities.
But the nation got its railroads, settlements, and minerals. In other cases,
property interests were not transferred in fee, but changed hands

211.
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134

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

undercontracts or permits that amounted to nearly the same thing and
achieved equivalent results, as with the fifty year terms for federally
licensed hydropower.
A. If Current Incentives Are Not Enough
The policy dialogue to-date about promoting ocean wind energy
has found grudging agreement on use of tax policy to create financial
incentives, and marginal adaptations of the pre-existing seabed mineral
leasing regime. Proposals to create green energy mandates for electric
utilities have found no lasting traction in Congress. The nation’s fiscal
situation is not friendly to proposals for spending a lot more money to
stimulate the industry. The debate so far does not give consideration to
use of the seabed as an asset to be traded for development of a new,
immense, carbon-free energy resource.
United States marine policy is not, at present, helpful. In the last
decade, two highly respected national commissions explored ocean policy
priorities and options for the United States. The reports of the Pew
212
Commission on Ocean Policy in 2003
and the U.S. Commission on
213
Oceans Policy in 2004
each focused on ways to strengthen the quality
of ocean governance for the benefit of the nation’s economy and
environment. Each noted that climate change added risk to ocean
ecosystems, but neither gave more than passing consideration to ocean
wind energy. In fact, little more was said other than the U.S.
Commission’s suggestion that the federal government create a renewable
214
energy leasing system that extracts a fair return for the taxpayer.
The
two reports’ near indifference to ocean wind reflects the nascent state of
the technology, as well as the condition of the public policy debate on
climate and energy only ten years ago. It was a different era, a time when
ocean wind technology was a far off notion, climate and energy policy
were being set by the Bush Administration, and nobody would have
thought to consider seriously whether ownership of the underwater public
domain should be reconsidered as an urgently needed step to stimulate
renewable energy development. Six years later, however, when President
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Obama issued an Executive Order establishing a national ocean policy,
marine renewables received little specific attention, and only as another
215
potential future use to be reconciled with all others.
Even today, with ocean wind technology maturing rapidly, billions
invested in projects off other countries’ shores, and an Administration
eager to act to promote renewable energy and combat climate change, the
question appears not to have received any serious exploration by
policymakers Why not? Is there no conceivable way that the ownership
value of public land under the sea could be transferred in sufficient
quantity from the federal government to wind project developers to
stimulate large investments in ocean wind projects?
B. Thinking Differently about Doing the Right Thing
Intuitively, one knows that the objections to transferring ownership
of seabeds will be numerous and strong. Most will start from the
assumption that, since oceans have always been public, any degree of
“privatization” is somehow illegitimate by definition. Convention and
continuity have stabilizing value in society, and novelty, as such, is not an
adequate basis for lawmaking. But the status quo deserves a good airingout if the climate change-related risks forecast by most scientists are
indeed coming to roost in the United States and around the globe.
C. Does Changing Ownership Really Mean Reducing Environmental
Protection?
Some may take the ideological view that the ocean is no place for
new, large-scale energy development. Other objections will arise from the
concern that environmental values of marine areas will be jeopardized by
any change in policy that might weaken federal regulatory control over
development. But a better perspective is that some places offshore are
more suitable to renewable energy development than others, and
particularly at a time when most scientists and many government and
private sector leaders believe the global environment is at risk, we should
work very hard to find those suitable places and use them.
The current Administration has only just begun to implement
some of the marine resource protection and management programs
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recommended by the oceans commissions and its own task force.
Those recommendations were prompted by deep concern over degradation
of marine resources. Proposals for “privatization” have gained a bad
reputation among those in the conservation community, and elsewhere,
who see them as reflections not of legitimate policy, but only as
manifestations of certain private sector actors’ appetite to cast off federal
rules protecting the environment or taxpayer.
The United States has struggled mightily to protect its ocean
environment. It would be wrong to decide to abandon the oceans to save
the atmosphere (as if the fate of one were not inextricable from the other),
but fortunately that is not the choice. Ocean wind development does not
have to occur everywhere offshore, and wind development does not have
to be unrestrained by environmental standards.
Some marine areas should be off limits, including key habitats for
marine wildlife. Other areas may be too sensitive as a matter of aesthetics.
But the oceans off our beaches are very big places. Large areas of seabed
are over the horizon (beyond the view of parks or anyone’s vacation
home), and they are probably not central to reproductive success of
whales, fish, seabirds or other marine life, or otherwise essential to
maintain in their current state. Ocean wind energy projects are
“development” in undeveloped areas, but it is likely that some
characteristics of wind projects will have positive direct consequences for
marine ecosystems, such as providing cover for juvenile fish or structure
217
for growth of beneficial marine plants.
The “marine spatial planning” required under the Administration’s
oceans policy should help identify the areas offshore most suitable for
218
wind development.
The Administration’s efforts to identify Wind
Energy Areas is a solid step in that direction, a sensible way to distinguish
between sites to be developed and those to be left alone. The
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environmental reviews contemplated by Interior Department’s current
leasing program should help characterize the potential impacts from wind
219
farms within selected areas.
There is no conclusive answer today to the question whether any
existing environmental rules should change to promote ocean wind. It is
not entirely unreasonable for some to fear that if those rules, or the
government’s ability to apply them, change, environmental harm will
follow. Similarly, those on the development side would be reasonable to
wish for the easiest regulatory path forward. Environmental standards and
procedures are critical variables in the formula for ocean wind energy
development, but there are no ocean wind projects in our waters, no
empirical test of the law’s adequacy, and nothing to use to argue
conclusively that specific changes in the law, or its application, are
essential to the expansion of the technology.
D. Does Congress Have the Power to Innovate?
The Property Clause of the United States Constitution gives
Congress broad, nearly limitless power over federal property, including
the public lands, by authorizing Congress to “dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
220
belonging to the United States.”
In 1976, the Supreme Court described
221
Congress’s power over the public domain as “without limitations.”
As
one leading commentator described it, the immense power handed to
Congress under the Property Clause has given “political forces free rein to
adjust national policies to accommodate the vast social and economic
222
changes that have occurred since the United States was established.”
Since the founding of the nation, that policy has shifted from early
acquisition, to disposal during the era of westward expansion, to retention
and management in the early 20th century, and finally come to give
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greater emphasis to environmental conservation and public involvement in
223
decision-making.
Property rights, whether owned privately or publicly, can be
conceptualized, as any first-year law student has learned, as sticks in a
224
bundle, an assembly of individual and separable parts.
Rights of a
property owner within the bundle of sticks may include, among other
things, the right to sell or give away, right of possession, right of use, right
to manage, right to the income from the property (i.e., to lease or sell the
profits), right to the capital, right to security, and right to the prohibition of
225
harmful use.
Rights within the bundle of sticks can be parsed out and
226
sold, leased, given away, or managed separately.
In the early 19th century and during the beginning of the land
disposal era, the United States did not manage its property interest in the
public lands as a “bundle of sticks” that could be separated. Early
homestead laws and railroad grants, for example, gave away the entire plot
of land and all the attendant rights. Later laws reserved certain rights to
the government; for example, the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916,
227
reserved ownership of the subsurface mineral estate.
In the modern era of public lands governance, the full panoply of
ownership rights deserve consideration as potential bargaining chips to
trade as incentives for ocean wind development. Transfer of federal
ownership in the seabeds is not an all-or-nothing proposition. Indeed, the
traditional oil and gas leasing framework currently applied to ocean wind
conveys a limited use-right for the ocean floor. But other sticks in the
ownership bundle may provide as much or better incentives to private
developers.
E. Can We Use Ownership as the Carrot to Drive the Horse?
If United States policymakers wish to tap the property value of the
submerged public lands to stimulate ocean wind, what choices are
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available? Policymakers could turn fully to historic precedent and consider
complete transfer of ownership, conversion of public land fully to private
hands, as happened with homesteads and railroads. The Property Clause
of the Constitution is certainly that broad. However, for the purpose of this
analysis, we have assumed that more limited proposals merit consideration
first.
1. Royalties and Fees
To begin, the United States could, at least for a time and in certain
areas, drop the stick in the traditional landlord’s property rights bundle
that expects royalty payments or other use-right or administrative fees
from renewable energy generating “tenants.” Fiscal hawks on Capitol Hill
and in the Office of Management and Budget surely would object to the
potential loss of federal revenues, but right now, and for years to come—
without changes—there will be no revenues of any size from ocean wind
development. The section of the 2005 Energy Policy Act that authorized
OCS leasing for renewable energy requires DOI to collect “fair returns”
for the United States. DOI has opted to collect fees and royalties based in
part on the competitive prices of other grid supplies, which reflects
228
fairness in one sense.
But royalty payments and fees are
unquestionably an impediment to development of the new industry, which
could help the nation greatly trim its greenhouse gas emissions and reduce
the risks of climate change. Fairness has a different aspect seen from this
different, intergenerational perspective. The degree of impediment will
vary with the price of competitive energy options onshore, and other
factors affecting project finances, but fees and royalties inherently make
ocean wind more expensive, less competitive, and less attractive to
investors. Whatever theoretical importance ocean wind royalty collections
may have as a federal fiscal prerogative, their actual function today is to
frustrate a top policy objective of the same sovereign.
The United States could transfer the royalty-collection right to
wind project developers themselves, who, perhaps in return for developing
a certain quantity of ocean wind power, would receive the right to collect
royalties from other seabed uses in particular sites. Similarly, the United
States could grant exclusive rights to ocean wind developers to develop
and earn revenue from other features of the ocean energy system,
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including transmission and communications.
Developers of key
transmission assets, too, might be offered lease, or revenue collection
rights, or both.
2. Financing
In tandem with other measures, the United States could agree to
allow an ocean wind developer to encumber the project-related seabed
with debt, to pledge the seabed as an asset, while agreeing to subordinate
any federal claim to that asset. It is not at all clear what value the private
market might place on any area of seabed, or whether private markets
would treat the public seabed as an asset, but the United States has a
considerable degree of faith in private markets to find value in an immense
array of situations. It would seem reasonable to consider how the markets
might respond now and over time if the seabed could be pledged as an
asset.
3. Shifting Management Responsibility
One can imagine alternative governance bodies—perhaps marine
development cooperatives—where federal ownership and resource
management prerogatives would be transferred to government chartered
corporations or other quasi-governmental entities charged with promoting
and managing the suite of energy and other resource uses in a given
marine area. Alaska native corporations and, in some ways, the federal
power marketing administrations such as the Bonneville Power
Administration and Tennessee Valley Authority, fit within this concept.
States could be placed in the same roles envisioned here for private
sector developers. In many ways, the hand-off of ownership prerogatives
from the federal government to states might be simpler. Most examples of
successful investment in energy generation and transmission lie with the
private sector, or with the federal government itself (i.e., federal
hydropower projects), and not with the states. That said, the coastal states
include many with aggressive renewable energy policies and sophisticated
technology sectors. Some states, such as Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia have taken steps to promote wind in
state waters. Why couldn’t any of those states or California or Oregon or
Hawaii or others step into the shoes of the federal government to carry
ocean wind development forward?
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These suggestions would shift ownership prerogatives from the
federal government to others to promote development. These ideas are, in
some respects, comparable to, though less extreme than, the railroad land
grant policies of the 19th century and homestead laws. They need not
stand alone, of course. A glance back at the federal reclamation program
and national forest management provides examples of federal investment
in capital projects leveraging substantial value onto private land and
economic activity. Federal dams and canals leveraged farms and
towns. Federal roads leveraged the forest products industry. Federally
generated electricity and federally built transmission leveraged
electrification of rural and other areas. This era of sequestration and tight
budgets is not encouraging to consideration of new federal expenditures,
but the United States’ own experience shows how federal expenditures on
infrastructure can stimulate development deemed to be a public priority,
including, potentially, ocean wind.
Alongside these suggestions, an ocean wind promoter would
almost certainly wish to add a call to maintain the various tax incentives
enacted in recent years. Others would emphasize measures to lower
regulatory hurdles to siting, including, particularly, the multi-layered
229
environmental review process set by DOI under NEPA.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal lawmaking is usually an inefficient and difficult process,
rarely more so than now. The difficulties seem particularly acute in
relation to proposals to legislate on climate or energy policy. Anyone
watching Capitol Hill today will see little encouragement that the
229.
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Republican-led House of Representatives and the Democratic-led Senate
will find common ground to do anything on those two issues in the near
future.
An optimist would, however, note that the Republican and
Democratic party platforms from the 2012 presidential election can be
juxtaposed in a way that suggests an area of possible agreement. Both
platforms acknowledge the importance of the United States’ natural
230
resources,
and both agree that the country should develop renewable
energy. The Republicans’ platform calls for policies aimed “at energy
security to ensure an affordable, stable, and reliable energy supply for all
parts of the country” and Democrats urge promotion of “smart policies
that lead to greater growth in clean energy generation and result in a range
231
of economic and social benefits.”
The Republican platform “encourage[s] the cost-effective
232
development of renewable energy.”
It promotes a “pathway toward a
market-based approach for renewable energy sources” and one that
“aggressively develop[s] alternative sources for electricity generation such
233
as wind.”
However, it does so with the caveat that “the taxpayers
234
should not serve as venture capitalists for risky endeavors.”
The party
instead believes that the “role of public officials must be to encourage
235
responsible development across the board.”
The party would “let the
236
free market and public’s preferences determine the industry outcomes.”
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The Democratic platform does not endorse privatizing natural
resource development, but strongly endorses the need to address global
237
The Democrats “commit to significantly reducing the
climate change.
238
pollution that causes climate change.”
These are thin reeds, to be sure. Party platforms do not guarantee
policy initiatives. But if the goal of incentivizing ocean wind energy
could be served by reducing the hurdle represented by federal ownership,
would that not seem to resonate with each party’s view of good policy?
Our goal for this article has been to suggest a different and
supplemental way to think about ocean wind development policy. We
believe that the United States’ experience setting lands policy aimed at
achieving major national goals is a useful lens through which to consider
the country’s options for promoting ocean wind.
United States
policymakers achieved big things for the benefit of the country by
transferring public land ownership. If the President, his chief economic
advisors, the overwhelming majority of climate scientists, and many
others are right about climate change risks, now would seem to be a time
to at least begin a discussion about the full array of alternatives for using
the wealth represented by the submerged public lands as an inducement to
large scale investment in ocean wind energy.
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Democratic Platform at 20.
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